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THE SUBMISSIVE MAJORITY: MODERN
TRENDS IN THE LAW CONCERNING
WOMEN'S RIGHTS
Faith A. Seidenberg-
The popular assumption that the law is even-handed does not
hold true in the area of women's rights. Under the guise of paternal-
ism (and you notice the word refers to a father), women have system-
atically been denied the equal protection of laws. Recently, however,
there has been an upsurge of the feminist movement, and men are
being forced to take a second look at some of the paternalistic laws
they have propounded. Although challenge to the laws adversely af-
fecting women is presently at about the same stage that the civil rights
movement occupied in the 1930's, in the last few years there has never-
theless been a small beginning towards equal rights.
I
CRiMINAL LAW
The idea that a "bad" woman is much worse than a "bad" man
probably can be traced to the witch hunts that took place in the early
days of the American Colonies; however, it survives to the present day.
For example, it is a crime for a woman to engage in prostitution1 but
not for her customer to use her services. She is breaking the law, it
seems, while he is only doing what comes naturally. However, in City
of Portland v. Sherill2 a city ordinance that punished women but not
men who offered themselves for immoral purposes was held unconsti-
tutional.
In addition, in several states higher penalties are imposed on a
woman who commits a crime than on a man who commits the same
crime.3 The constitutionality of greater penalties for women was re-
j- President, Syracuse Chapter of National Organization for Women. B.A. 1944, J.D.
1954, Syracuse University.
1 See THE SocIm. Evu. (Seligman ed. 1902); George, Legal, Medical and Psychiatric
Considerations in the Control of Prostitution, 60 MicH. L. RiEv. 717 (1962).
2 No. M-47623 (Circuit Ct., Multnomah County, Ore., Jan. 9, 1967).
3 E.g., Pennsylvania, Connecticut. See statutes upheld in Ex parte Gosselin, 141 Me.
412, 44 A.2d 882 (1945); Platt v. Commonwealth, 256 Mass. 539, 152 N.E. 914 (1926).
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cently challenged in two cases. In Commonwealth v. Daniels4 a woman
was first sentenced to a term of from one to four years for the crime
of robbery; one month later the sentence was vacated and the defen-
dant resentenced to up to ten years under Pennsylvania's Muncy Act.8
The Muncy Act provided that a woman imprisoned for a crime "pun-
ishable by imprisonment for more than a year" should be sentenced
to an indeterminate period of up to three years except when the crime
for which she was sentenced had a maximum of more than three years,
in which case she had to receive the maximum sentence. That is, for
a crime carrying a sentence of one to ten years, a man might have been
sentenced to one to four years, but a woman could only be sentenced
to an indefinite term of up to ten years. The discretion of the trial
judge to set a maximum term for a woman of less than the maximum
for the crime involved was thereby eliminated. The Superior Court
of Pennsylvania affirmed the trial court's action, holding that longer
incarceration for women is justifiable because of "the physiological and
psychological make-up of women... their roles in society [and] their
unique vocational skills and pursuits .... ."0 Whatever their signifi-
cance, these characteristics did not convince the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court that the Muncy Act's classification was reasonable. The court
held that women are entitled to the protection afforded by the equal
protection clause of the United States Constitution and, since the max-
imum sentence is the real sentence, that a sentence of ten years for
women as opposed to four years for men is unconstitutional. 7 In
United States ex rel. Robinson v. York8 a federal district court held a
4 210 Pa. Super. 156, 232 A.2d 247 (1967).
5 PA. STAT. tit. 61, § 566 (1964), as amended, (Supp. 1969).
6 210 Pa. Super. at 164, 232 A.2d at 252. The philosophy of the statute is more
cogently, if not convincingly, explained as follows:
There is little doubt in the minds of those who have had much experience in
dealing with women delinquents, that the fundamental fact is that they belong
to a class of women who lead sexually immoral lives....
[Such a statute] would remove permanently from the community the feeble-
minded delinquents who are now generally recognized as a social menace, and
would relieve the state from the ever increasing burden of the support of their
illegitimate children.
Commonwealth v. Daniels, 210 Pa. Super. 156, 171 n.2, 232 A.2d 247, 255 n.2 (1967)
(dissenting opinion). Oddly enough, the material quoted from the Daniels case was sup-
plied by Philadelphia District Attorney Arlen Specter in a brief urging the unconsti-
tutionality of the Muncy Act.
7 430 Pa. 642, 243 A.2d 400 (1968). Shortly thereafter the Pennsylvania legislature
enacted a statute that required the court to set a maximum sentence, but prohibited
it from setting a minimum term. PA. STAT. tit. 61, § 566 (Supp. 1969).
8 281 F. Supp. 8 (D. Conn. 1968).
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
Connecticut statute9 similar to the Muncy Act unconstitutional. The
decision was appealed by the state's Attorney General, but he with-
drew the appeal after the decision came down in the Daniels case.
Sixteen women, who had already served more time than a man's maxi-
mum sentence, were released. 10
Criminal abortion statutes" are another example of the law's dis-
crimination against women. That a woman has a right to control her
own body is perhaps an idea whose time has yet to come, but there
is at least a glimmering in some legal minds. Most lawyers and legis-
lators, if they are talking about the subject at all, are still talking in
terms of abortion reform instead of abortion repeal.12 They discuss a
need for change, but they sound a cautious note.13 One case moving
against the prevailing winds, however, is People v. Belous,14 recently
decided in the Supreme Court of California. The defendant was con-
victed for performing an abortion, and an amicus curiae counsel argued
that
[t]he right of reproductive autonomy sought to be protected
here is clearly more basic and essential to a woman's dignity, self-
respect and personal freedom than those personal rights . . .for
which Constitutional protection has already been afforded. Prob-
ably, nothing except death itself can affect a woman's life more
seriously than enforced bearing of children and enforced responsi-
bility for them for perhaps the remainder of her and their lives.
The choice must be that of the woman unless some overwhelming
state interest requires otherwise, and those state interests generally
adverted to will be shown below to be significantly, for constitu-
tional purposes, less important than the interest of the woman
9 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-360 (1958).
10 Middletown Press, Aug. 12, 1968, at 1, col. 1 (Middletown, Connecticut).
11 E.g., CAT. PENAL CODE § 274 (West 1955). Prior to its liberalization in 1967, it
was similar to statutes in 41 other jurisdictions. Leavy & Kummer, Criminal Abortion:
A Failure of Law, 50 A.B.A.J. 52 n.2 (1964).
12 But see Brief for Appellant as Amicus Curiae at 37-38, People v. Belous, 71 Cal.
2d 996, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969), reporting that Father Robert Drinan, Dean
of Boston College Law School, has come out for repeal on the grounds that it should be a
matter of individual conscience, not law.
13 See, e.g., L. KANOWrrZ, WOMEN AND THE LAw: THE UNFINisnED REvOLUTION 27
(1969):
Though very few people would urge the legalization of all abortions, the
principle of legal equality of the sexes is an additional reason for extending
the circumstances under which therapeutic abortions should be legally justified.
14 71 Cal. 2d 996, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969).
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herself. That right should be protected to the fullest by a holding
that no state interest can control this field. 15
In New York two bills, one for reform of abortion'16 and one for
repeal,17 were before the state legislature in the spring of 1969. Only
the former had any chance of passing. Had it not been for the National
Organization for Women's coming out strongly in 1968 for abortion
repeal,' 8 followed by agreement by the State Council of Churches'19
and the American Civil Liberties Union" on this position, the bills
would probably not have been considered at all. However, as is begin-
ning to be seen in California, where the abortion laws were just re-
formed, 21 abortion reform is worse from the standpoint of freedom of
choice for the woman than no reform at all.22
II
Crvm RiGHTs
For untold years there have been so-called "protective" laws regu-
lating the working conditions of women. Necessary changes are begin-
ning to be made, but the progress is slow; even legal experts do not
always recognize the full dimensions of the problem. One commen-
tator, for example, has remarked of women's working laws:
With regard to social policy, the initial reaction is that the
modern woman should not be subjected to state protective restric-
tions on her right to work should she choose to experience the con-
ditions from which she is being protected. However, it is clear that
the extent to which sex differences constitute "discrimination" is
a question of degree, depending upon what social mores it seems
desirable to perpetuate .... [Here], considerations of preserving
femininity and motherhood appear.23
15 Belous Brief, supra note 12, at 10-11 (footnotes omitted).
16 (1969) Assy. Int. No. 3473-A (Mr. Blumenthal).
17 (1969) Assy. Int. No. 1061 (Mrs. Cook).
18 See 2 Now Acrs 14 (Winter-Spring 1969).
19 New York State Council of Churches Leg. Release No. 8 (Feb. 10, 1969).
20 American Civil Liberties Union Release (March 25, 1968).
21 CAL. PENAL CODE § 274 (West Supp. 1968).
22 Two actions were just filed in New York to have that state's abortion statutes
declared unconstitutional. N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1969, at 53, col. 1; id., Oct. 1, 1969, at 55,
col. 3.
23 Oldham, Sex Discrimination and State Protective Laws, 44 D.NVm L. REv. 344,
1970]
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Unfortunately, this misses the point. The net effect of these laws is to
limit the advancement of women in industry and, since women are
everywhere the majority, to ensure that there is always a large supply
of poorly-paid persons.
California has a particularly stringent system of governing wo-
men's employment. Section 1350 of the California Labor Code,24 for
example, prohibits an employer from employing women workers for
more than eight hours a day or forty-eight hours a week. The effect
of this restriction is to prevent women, solely because of their sex,
from pursuing certain better-paid occupations, such as running test
equipment, doing final assembly work, and working as supervisors,
and from earning overtime pay in the positions they now hold. In ad-
dition, paragraph 17 of the California Industrial Welfare Commis-
sion's Order No. 9-6825 not only regulates wages, hours, and working
conditions of women and minors in the transportation industry but
also limits the number of pounds a woman may lift to twenty-five.
This regulatory system was recently challenged. In Mengelkoch
v. Industrial Welfare Commission26 plaintiffs asked that a three-judge
court be convened because the constitutionality of section 1350 was an
important constitutional issue to be resolved. The request was denied.
However, in a similar case, Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co.,27 the
judge ruled in favor of plaintiff. This case concerned both section 1350
and paragraph 17. In it, plaintiff, a woman, applied for a job that had
375 (1967) (emphasis added). But see R. Seidenberg, Our Outraged Remnant, 6 Psym-
ATRIC OPINION, Oct. 1969, at 18:
The exaggeration of the difference between the sexes has been used to justify
misogyny. Our young people want to make it difficult to distinguish between
the sexes to show that everything feminine is not contemptible. One can wear
long hair proudly; to be taken for a woman is not something to despair. Make
the sexes undifferentiated, and then, perhaps, the mythology of "feminine" and
"masculine" will be revealed for what it really is-a ruse to keep women sub-
jugated and to guarantee men an unearned superiority.
24 CAL. LABOR CODE § 1350 (West Supp. 1968):
No female shall be employed in any manufacturing, mechanical, or mercantile
establishment or industry, laundry, . . . cleaning and dyeing establishment, hotel,
public lodging house . . . in this state, more than eight hours during any one
day of 24 hours or more than 48 hours in one week ....
Females covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act, however, are exempt from
the prohibitions of § 1350. Id. § 1350.5.
25 CAL. ADMIN. COD tit. 8, § 11460 (1968). The division of public welfare is given
specific enforcement power of § 1350. CAL. LABOR CODE § 1356 (West Supp. 1968).
26 284 F. Supp. 950 (C.D. Cal.), vacated, 393 U.S. 993 (1968).
27 293 F. Supp. 1219 (CMD. Cal. 1968).
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just opened up at the defendant company's facilities at Thermal, Cali-
fornia. Although she was the most senior employee bidding for the
position and was fully qualified, the company assigned a male with
less seniority than plaintiff. The company never tested or evaluated
plaintiff's ability to perform the work required, but argued that the
appointment was within its discretion as an employer and, since plain-
tiff was a woman, that her assignment to the position would violate
the California Labor Code. The court, however, held both that the
California hours and weights legislation discriminates against women
and is therefore unconstitutional and that defendant's refusal to assign
plaintiff to Thermal was not a lawful exercise of its discretion as an
employer.
Restrictions on the amount of weight a woman can legally lift28
are under attack in other states. An employer's thirty-five pound limi-
tation29 was tested in Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.,ao where the court
held it legal and proper for an employer to fix a thirty-five pound max-
imum weight for carrying or lifting by female employees. In another
case, Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co.,3 1 defendant
company took the position that because the job of switchman required
lifting weight in excess of thirty pounds, the legal limit in Georgia 2
a woman could not hold the job. The company conceded that plaintiff
had seniority over the male awarded the position and that she was
paid $78 per week as opposed to the $135 she would receive if she were
a switchman. The sole issue in the case was whether or not sex is a
bona fide occupational qualification, entitling defendant to bar a
28 The typical restriction to 30 or 35 pounds is ironic if the goal is to preserve the
femininity of women laborers; mothers commonly lift their children until they are 6
or 7 years old, when they weigh at least 70 pounds.
29 Originally instituted because of substantial female employment during World
War II, this practice continued even when the men returned to work. Bowe v. Colgate-
Palmolive Co., 272 F. Supp. 332, 340 (S.D. Ind. 1967).
30 272 F. Supp. 332 (S.D. Ind. 1967). The provision was also challenged in Sellers v.
Colgate-Palmolive Co., - F.2d - (7th Cir. 1969), which held in favor of the plaintiffs.
The Bowe court did hold, however, that use of a seniority list segregated by sex,
which resulted in certain female employees being laid off from employment while males
with less plant seniority were retained, resulted in discrimination in violation of the
1964 Civil Rights Act. 272 F. Supp. at 359.
31 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
82 Rule 59, promulgated by Georgia Commissioner of Labor, pursuant to GA. CODE
ANN. § 54-122(d) (1961): "[f]or women and minors, not over 30 pounds." A more flexible
rule, setting no specific limitations, replaced Rule 59 in 1968. See 408 F.2d at 233.
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woman, as such, from consideration for the job of switchman, her ca-
pacities notwithstanding. The lower court held for defendant, but the
Fifth Circuit reversed, finding illegal discrimination based on sex.
Segregated "help wanted" advertisements are another aspect of
discrimination against women. Although the Civil Rights Act of 1964
forbids most such ads to be placed in newspapers 3 and forbids discrim-
ination by sex in employment, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission guidelines34 nonetheless allowed two columns classified by
sex to stand in the newspapers. In July 1968, therefore, the National
Organization for Women brought a mandamus suit against the EEOC
to compel it to enforce the law as written. The court summarily dis-
missed the complaint, saying that obviously some jobs .were better
suited to men and others to women,8 5 but the suit did cause the EEOC
to change its guidelines to conform with the law. 6 The American
Newspaper Publishers Association brought an action to enjoin enforce-
ment of the guidelines8 7 both the district court and the court of ap-
peals found for the EEOC. However, although the New York Times
and some other New York newspapers have now desegregated their
want ads, most newspapers around the country still refuse to abide by
the law.
The public accommodations section s of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, unlike the employment section, does not forbid discrimination
on account of sex. A test case39 was recently brought in New York
against a Syracuse hotel that does not allow women to sit at the bar
unescorted, and the action was dismissed. The court emphasized, first,
38 Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 704(b), 78 Stat. 257, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(b) (1964):
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer, labor or-
ganization, or employment agency to print or publish or cause to be printed or
published any notice or advertisement relating to employment by such an em-
ployer or membership in or any classification or referral for employment by
such a labor organization, or relating to any classification or referral for em-
ployment by such an employment agency, indicating any preference, limitation,
specification, or discrimination, based on race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin, except that such a notice or advertisement may indicate a preference,
limitation, specification, or discrimination based on religion, sex, or national
origin when religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational quali-
fication for employment.
84 31 Fed. Reg. 6414 (1966).
385 The court pointed out that secretaries are obviously female, despite the presence
in front of the bench of the male stenographer.
36 29 C.F.R. § 1604.4 (1969).
37 American Newspaper Pub. Ass'n v. Alexander, 294 F. Supp. 1100 (D.D.C. 1968).
38 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1964).
S DeCrow v. Hotel Syracuse Corp., 288 F, Supp. 530 (N.D.N.Y. 1968).
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that there was no state action, since the women who sat in at the bar
were not arrested; and second, because the public accommodation law
does not forbid discrimination on the basis of sex, that the hotel could
discriminate if it so wished.40
The case was not appealed because the author, whose case it
was, thought it would be relatively easy to obtain state action in an
arrest. Accordingly, she and another member of the National Organ-
ization for Women sat in at several bars, including one in New York
City that has not served women for the last one huhldred and fourteen
years. Although they suffered many indignities, they were not arrested.
The author then decided to bring an action in a New York state court
under a new section of the state civil rights law41 that makes it
illegal to refuse to serve a customer "without just cause." Summary
judgment was granted to defendants and the case was dismissed. The
author filed a third case, however, that was heard on August 6, 1969
and that was decided in favor of plaintiff.
III
PRIVATE LAW
Some colleges have strict rules covering the hours when coeds
must be in their dormitories and an inflexible system of signing in
40 Id. at 532. It is interesting to note that the court did not find the hotel's admitted
discrimination offensive; this is in accord with public opinion. The Syracuse Post-
Standard said in a lead editorial:
The campaign waged for several months by the National Organization for
Women (NOW) against Hotel Syracuse for its long-standing policy of refusing
to serve drinks to unescorted women at the bar in the Rainbow Lounge has
reached another absurd point.
All sororities at Syracuse University have been asked to refuse to patronize
Hotel Syracuse "because they discriminate against women at their bar," in a
letter from Faith A. Seidenberg, one of three directors of the Central New York
Chapter of NOW.
Hotel Syracuse has had the no-unescorted-women-at-the-bar rule ever since
Prohibition was repealed in an effort "to maintain the dignity of the room"
and to discourage undesirables and wouldbe pickups from frequenting the
Rainbow Lounge, which is at street level, just off the main entrance to the hotel.
Hotel Syracuse should be commended for running a decent place, instead
of being subjected to the repeated persecution of sit-ins and boycott efforts.
Surely any women's rights group could find a better cause than thisl
Syracuse Post-Standard, Nov. 8, 1968, at 12, col. 1.
41 N.Y. Civ. Rsarrs LAi, § 40-e (McKinney Supp. 1969).
1970]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
and out.42  Regulation is the product of the idea that a university
stands in loco parentis to its students, an idea that is hopefully chang-
ing. After all, a married women of eighteen is considered to be "eman-
cipated" from her parents under the law.43 Why then is a college
student living away from home not equally adult? But in any case,
the rationale is not consistently applied; male students are not sub-
jected to the same restrictions as women in the use of the dormitories,
or even to the requirement that they live on campus. The Oneonta
College curfew was challenged, but the case was dismissed on tech-
nical grounds without examination of the merits. Possibly because
of the suit, however, the college voluntarily rescinded its curfew
regulations, 44 so the students were the ultimate winners.
A double standard is also apparent in the law governing married
women. Under present law, a married woman loses her name and
becomes lost in the anonymity of her husband's name. Her domi-
cile is his no matter where she lives,45 which means she cannot vote
or run for office in her place of residence if her husband lives else-
where. If she wants an annulment and is over eighteen, in certain cases
she cannot get one,4 6 but her husband can until he is twenty-one.47 In
practice, if not in theory, she cannot contract for any large amount,
borrow money, or get a credit card in her own name. She is, in fact, a
non-person with no name.
Women receive little in exchange for this loss of status. Al-
though in theory the husband and wife are one person, the relation-
ship "has worked out in reality to mean... the one is the husband." 48
For example, husband and wife do not have equal rights to consor-
tium, 49 the exclusive right to the services of the spouse and to his
or her society, companionship, and conjugal affection."0 Until re-
42 E.g., Syracuse University at Syracuse, N.Y. Letter sent to parents of freshmen,
January 1969 (freshman curfew); State University of New York at Oneonta, Experimental
Women's Hours Policy, spring semester 1968 (freshman curfew).
43 E.g., N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 140(b) (McKinney 1964).
44 State University of New York at Oneonta, Experimental Women's Hours Policy
(Rev. Sept. 1968).
45 New York Trust Co. v. Riley, 24 Del. Ch. 354, 16 A.2d 772 (1940). But see N.Y.
DoM. REL. LAW § 61 (McKinney 1964).
46 E.g., CAL. Civ. CoDE §§ 56, 82 (West Supp. 1968).
47 E.g., id.
48 United States v. Yazel, 382 U.S. 341, 861 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
49 Burk v. Anderson, 232 Ind. 77, 81, 109 N.E.2d 407, 408 (1952) (dictum).
50 Smith v. Nicholas Bldg. Co., 98 Ohio 101, 112 N.E. 204 (1915).
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cently it was everywhere the law that only the husband could recover
for loss of consortium, and this is still the law in about two-thirds
of the states."' The major breakthrough came in 1950 in Hitaffer v.
Argonne Co.,5 2 which reversed the prevailing rule. In a more recent
case, Karczewski v. Baltimore 6- O.R.R.,53 the court concluded, "[m]ar-
riage is no longer viewed as a 'master-servant relationship,' "5 and in
Owen v. Illinois Baking Corp.55 the court held that denying a wife
the right to sue for loss of consortium while permitting such suit
to a husband violates the equal protection clause.5 6
The unreasonableness of denying an action for loss of consortium
to the wife is well expressed by Michigan Supreme Court Justice
Smith:
The gist of the matter is that in today's society the wife's
position is analogous to that of a partner, neither kitchen slat-
tern nor upstairs maid. Her duties and responsibilties in respect
of the family unit complement those of the husband, extending
only to another sphere. In the good times she lights the hearth
with her own inimitable glow. But when tragedy strikes it is a
part of her unique glory that, forsaking the shelter, the comfort,
and warmth of the home, she puts her arm and shoulder to the
plow. We are now at the heart of the issue. In such circumstances,
when her husband's love is denied her, his strength sapped, and
his protection destroyed, in short, when she has been forced by
the defendant to exchange a heart for a husk, we are urged to rule
that she has suffered no loss compensable at the law. But let some
scoundrel dent a dishpan in the family kitchen and the law, in all
its majesty, will convene the court, will march with measured
tread to the halls of justice, and will there suffer a jury of her
51 See Moran v. Quality Alum. Casting Co., 34 Wis. 2d 542, 549-50 nn.15 & 16, 150
N.W.2d 137, 140 nn.15 & 16 (1968); Simeone, The Wife's Action for Loss of Consortium-
Progress or No?, 4 ST. Louis U.L.J. 424 (1957).
52 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
53 274 F. Supp. 169 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
54 Id. at 175. The court summarized the rationale of the prevailing rule:
The early status of women during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
vitally affected the common law attitude toward relational marital interests.
The wife was viewed for many purposes as a chattel of her husband, and he was
entitled to her services in the eyes of the law. . . .The wife, however, as a
"servant" was not entitled to sue for the loss of services of her husband, since in
theory he provided none.
Id. at 171.
55 260 F. Supp. 820 (W.D. Mich. 1966).
56 "To draw .such a distinction between a husband and wife is a classification which
is unreasonable and impermissible." Id. at 822.
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peers to assess the damages, Why are we asked, then, in the case
before us, to look the other way? Is this what is meant when it is
said that justice is blind?5 7
CONCLUSION
In theory all persons should be equal, but in practice women are
less "equal" than men. In all phases of life women are second-
class citizens leading legally sanctioned second-rate lives. The law,
it seems, has done little but perpetuate the myth of the helpless fe-
male best kept on her pedestal. In truth, however, that pedestal is
a cage bound by a constricting social system and hemmed in by layers
of archaic and anti-feminist laws.
57 Montgomery v. Stephan, 359 Mich. 33, 48-49, 101 N.W.2d 227, 234 (1960), quoted
with approval, Millington v. Southeastern Elev. Co., 22 N.Y.2d 498, 503-04, 239 N.E.2d
897, 900, 293 N.Y.S.2d 305, 309 (1968).
